This paper begirE by identifying the distinguishing characteristic of the "real business cycle" (RBC) class of macroeconomic models. It then scruitinizes existing evidence, presented in support of the RBC approach, of three types: calibrated general equilibrium models with no monetary sector, vector-autoregression variance decomposition results, and univariate measurements of trend and cyclical components. It is argued that, in fact, these types of evidence have so far provided little support for the RBC hypothesis. Finally, with regard to an important alternative hypothesis concerning macroeconomic fluctuations, the paper proposes a partial rationalization for the stickiness of nominal product prices.
Introduction
it has now been 50 years since J.M. Keynes published his incomparably controversial General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. After a few apparent trends and a number of cycles in professional opinion, the macroeconomic debates of today have much in common with those of 1936 and the years that followed shortly after. In particular, with the recent downturn in popularity of the Lucas-Barro theory of cyclical fluctuations 1 induced by monetary misperceptions, the main competing explanations for these fluctuations are provided by the "real business cycle" and "sticky price"
(or "nominal rigidity") types of models, which are rather strongly representative of Classical and Keynesian viewpoints, respectively. Allied with these two views, moreover, are sharply divergent notions concerning the nature of unemployment and the seriousness, in terms of individuals' welfare, of fluctuations in measured unemployment rates.
As part of the ongoing effort to achieve an understanding of the macroeconomic phenomena with which this debate is concerned, the present paper begins in Section 2 by characterizing the real business cycle class of theories and scrutinizing one type of evidence that has led some researchers to embrace this approach. Sections 3 and 4 are then devoted to somewhat longer discussions of two other types of evidence pertaining to the real business cycle hypothesis. Then in Section 5 the discussion turns to a leading problem for sticky-price theories, viz., the difficulty of rationalizing the abundance of contracts set in nominal terms. Finally, Section 6 includes some conclusions and reflections on the nature of macroeconomic fluctuations. 1 
Real Business Cycle Models
Let us begin by stating explicitly what will here be meant by the real business cycle-henceforth, RBC-class of theories. In that regard, it seems clear that the distinguishing characteristic of RBC models is a denial that monetary policy actions have any significant impact on aggregate output and employment magnitudes. Admittedly, that hypothesis is not explicitly expressed in some of the significant papers in the RBC literature, and is possibly disbelieved by some of the main contributors. But if the class of models is distinctive enough to warrant a special label, it must have some distinguishing characteristic and there would seem to be no other contenders.
There is in the literature a lot of emphasis on "propagation mechanisms"-sources of serial correlation in output or employment-but that is also true of earlier contributions such as Lucas (1975) , Sargent (1979, Ch. 16 ), Blinder and Fischer (1981) , and others that are not regarded as comprising RBC models. The fact that Lucas (1972) , Barro (1976) , and other rationalexpectations models ignored serial correlation does not indicate that the authors believed such correlations to be nonexistent. The reason, rather, was that they wanted to concentrate, without severe distractions, on the single issue that seemed most interesting and difficult-why the aggregate data exhibited a Phillips relationship, i.e., a positive association between output/employment levels and the rate of change of nominal magnitudes such as the money stock. Emphasis on propagation mechanisms, to return to the point, does not provide a line of demarcation between RI3C and other classes of models; denial of monetary effects does.
The RBC point of view does not deny, of course, that there is any association between output and monetary magnitudes. But it attributes the observed money-output correlation to so-cal led "reverse causation," i.e., responses of the money stock, via the monetary authority and/or the banking sector, to variations in aggregate output. Thus, the R]3C theories in effect claim that observed Phillips-type correlations stem from the monetary system's reaction to output fluctuations that are induced by real shocks to tastes or technology-not from the non-bank private sector's reaction to monetary shocks.
Encouragement to the adoption of the RBC view has come from both theoretical and empirical studies. With respect to the former, this encouragement has been primarily negative-involving disenchantment on theoretical grounds with both of the leading alternative theories, the monetary misperception theory of Lucas and Barro on the one hand and the price-stickiness or nominal-contract approach of Fischer (1977) , Taylor (1980) , et. a!. on the other hand. Of equal importance, however, has been the compilation of statistical evidence that appears-at least on the surfaceto support the idea that monetary shocks have no significant output/employment effects. In this regard, three major types of evidence have been provided. First, there are the studies of Sims (1980 Sims ( ) (1982 and Litterman and Weiss (1985) which show that there is very little explanatory power for output variations provided by money stock innovations in vector autoregression (VAR) systems when nominal interest rates are included among the system's variables. Second, there is the notable study of Kydland and Prescott (1982) , which shows that several business-cycle correlations can be mimicked reasonably well with a competitive equilibrium model in which neither money nor govenrnent policy plays any role whatsoever. Finally, there is a line of argument developed primarily by Nelson and Plosser (1982) that relies entirely on the univariate timeseries properties of aggregate output, employment, and other real variables.
Briefly, the Nelson-Plosser argument is that most of the fluctuations in these variables should be attributed to the trend component, in a trend vs. cyclical decomposition, which would presumably be unaffected by monetary shocks.
In this section and the two that follow, I will argue that in fact none of these types of evidence actually provides much support for the RBC position:
the statistical results that have been interpreted as favorable evidence are actually just as consistent with other models as they are with RBC models.
To demonstrate such consistency does not, furthermore, require tortuous analysis relying upon highly indirect effects of questionable magnitude. In the process of developing this argument, I will suggest that there is presently in existence evidence that, while inconclusive, is awkward for the RBC class of models.
Let us begin, because of the brevity of the necessary discussion, with the evidence provided in the much-discussed study of Kydland and Prescott (1982) . As mentioned above, this study demonstrates that it is possible to match several important features of actual postwar U.S. quarterly data with a model that includes no monetary (or government ) sector-indeed, no nominal variables. The model is a one good, representative household, competitive equilibrium model in which intertemporal non-separability of preferences and investment gestation lags are quantitatively important. The only soia'ce of cyclical fluctuations is a technology shock--a random disturbance to the aggregate production function-that is composed of whitenoise and autocorrelated components in a mix that cannot be observed by the 2 agents (households and firms).
The sense in which the fluctuations implied by the Kydland-Prescott model match actual U.S. data is as follows. With parameters estimated by means of a minimum-distance estimator with a metric that is 3 unconventional -the authors term the estimation procedure calibration"-variances and correlations with output are calculated for several variables (consumption, investment, inventory stocks, manhours employment, etc.) and compared with actual U.S. quarterly values for 1950-79. The same is also done for output autocorrelations at lags one through six. These comparisons are reasonably favorable to the model, although Altug (1985) has shown that its fit is not good enough to avoid strong rejections when subjected to formal 4 hypothesis testing.
The results of Altug are not, however, the basis for my suggestion that 
Vector Autoregression Studies
Of the various studies under discussion, the first to appear in print was that of Sims (1980) , which was followed by Sims (1982) . In these papers reducing these fluctuations (Sims, 1980, p. 253 There are some similarities between the Sims findings and those in a notable recent study by Litterman and Weiss (1985) . In particular, the latter authors also find that the portion of output variance attributable to money stock innovatior declines sharply when a nominal interest rate is added to a small VAR system, and they also discuss matters as if the money stock were directly controlled by the Fed. They carry out a corEiderable amount of additional analysis, however, much of which concerna movements of the (ex ante) real rate of interest. This variable is unobservable, of course, but Litterman and Weiss are able to test various hypotheses concerning its behavior by application of cross-eqmtion restrictione on the VAR system, restrictiona that are implied by the definition of the real rate (at period t) as the nominal rate less the rationally predicted inflation rate (between t and t+1). Here "rational" meane the forecast value implied by the VAR system.
One of the more prominent findings in the Litterman-Weiss paper is that the real rate rt is not significantly C3ranger-caused in the quarterly U.S. data by any of the other variables involved, which are M(log of money), Y(log of output), P (log of price level), and R(the nominal interest rate).
On the basis of this finding, Litterman and Weiss suggest that theories of the Lucas-Barro and sticky-price types are contradicted by the data, as both transmit monetary impulses to real variables by way of the real rate. The impact of this suggestion is weakened, but not eliminated, by the nonequivalence of (i) the absence of Cr-anger-causality from other variables to r and (ii) the excgeneity of rt-the latter requiring the former and also the absence of within-period effects from other variables to r.
Other results reported in the Litterman-Weiss paper appear, upon first consideration, to provide evidence that is literally inconsistent with the RBC hypothesis. In particular, as the hypothesis implies that real variables 
Trend and Cyclical Components
In this section we continue by discussing the third type of pro-RBC evidence mentioned above, not only for completeness but also because the argument is itself of considerable interest. This argument, which was 17 developed initially by Nelson and Plosser (1982) , consists of two parts.
The first of these concludes, on the basis of statistical considerations to be (1982, p. 159) and so can contribute only to the cyclical componenL In that case the maximum extent of monetary effects on output (or employment) is limited by the variability of the cyclical component, and since that is small--according to the first part of the argument-it follows that output variability due to monetary fluctuations must be small. Now in principle one could object to the second half of this argument, basing his objection on the theoretical possibility of a "Tobin effect" of trending mean) in t mt be attributed to the secular component ' For the next step in their argument, Nelson and Plosser take it to be an established fact-established by their empirical investigation of several relevant U.S. data series-that the y variable under disctsion is generated by a process of the "difference stationary' or DS class. In other words, they take as given the hypothesis that t is a variable whose ARMA (i.e., autoregressive-moving average) representation includes a unit root in the AR polynomial and no deterministic trend. Since c is stationary, it then follows that the secular component y mt have a unit root in the AR polynomial of its ARMA representation. Consequently, the decomposition
(1) can be expressed as
where v and u are white noise shocks driving the secular and cyclical components, respectively, and where (3(L) and p(L) are polynomials in the lag operator L that satisfy conditions for stationarity and invertibility.
Also, the meaning of (i-LY in (2) is as follows: (1-L) x = x ÷ xj ÷ In addition, Nelson and Plosser also utilize the fact--established by their evidence-that the differenced series is (for many of the variables examined) appropriately represented as an invertible first-order MA process with a MA parameter that is positive and smaller than 1.0. In this case, since (2) implies that
ut, the first-order MA character of 11-t = requires that 0(L) = I + 01L with 0 < 01 < I and also that Ji(L) 1. In other words, under the stated restrictions (3) can be specialized to Now the foregoing argument is ingenious and rather appealing, but consideration indicates that it includes a link that is both crucial and weak.
The link in question is the hypothesis that is generated by a process of the DS class, i.e., that its ARMA representation involves a unit root in the AR polynomial and no deterministic trend component. That this hypothesis is crucial for the specific conclusion (7 > is clear, for without that hypothesis one is not led to the special representation (2) which, when and would not be too badly matched by (7) t = p .O2yt + 1-28t-i °3t2 ÷ both of which are obviously of the TS class. The point, of course, is the elementary one that one cannot establish with any degree of certainty that a series is of the DS class simply by inspection of the autocorrelation functions for its levels and differences.
For precisely that reason, Nelson and Plosser (1982, pp. 150 -2) also offer, as a third type of evidence, formal tests-based on procedures of Dickey and Fuller (1979) For an (extreme) illustration of this point regarding the removal of variation approximated by a random walk, consider the first-order AR But of course V(y) = u/(1-a) in this first-order AR case so For many purposes, the practical impossibility of distinguishing between a random walk and a process such as (8) with a close to 1.0 is of no great consequence. If the object were to forecast near-future values, for example, the predictions would be essentially the same whichever of the two representations was selected. In such cases, there is much to be said for parsimoniouely setting a = I and wing the random walk model. But if by contrast the purpose is to estimate the forecast variance for the level of the series 100 periods in the future, the choice between a = 1.0 and (say) a = 25 0.98 becomes critical and basing this choice on the principle of parsimony cannot be acceptable. The same is true, it would appear, when the purpose of one's study is to decompose a series into cyclical and secular components.
The foregoing analysis does not, it should be emphasized, constitute a claim that macroeconomic series such as (the log of) real GNP are members of the trend-stationary class. The claim is only that the time series evidence reported by Nelson and Plosser (1982) , and likewise that developed
by Stulz and Wasserfallen (1985) , is inadequate to determine whether the relevant series are of the DS or IS class. terms. Virtually all of the existing research in the area-most of which emphasizes risk and/or informational imperfections and asymmetries-is concerned with only the first of these aspects, and thus in effect seeks to explain contracts specified in real terms. These papers leave unanswered, accordingly, the question of why contracts or prices are in so many cases preset in nominal terms. They do not, in other words, explain why sellers who set money prices in advance of sales do not make these prices contingent upon movements in some general price index-why there is in this sense so 29 little "irxiexation" or, in the terminology of Eden (1983) , "linkage."
Some writers on the subject have suggested that an important reason for the paucity of linkage in the U.S. economy is that buyers and sellers would usually prefer to link to different price indices (or nominal aggregates such as the money stock). Blinder (1977, p. 70) , for example, has put the argument as followE:
I suggest that risk-averse firms would be happy to link factor payments to a price index which follows closely the movements of their own output prices, but shy away from contracts linking wages ... to some broad index whose movement might easily outstrip their selling prices. Conversely, workers ... may be unwilling to bear the substantial risks of linking their factor payments to the prices of firms for which they work [andi prefer linkage to a broad price index more or less representative of the things they buy.
But that argument evidently misses the point, for it explains why buyers and sellers might have trouble in agreeing what the best of all possible indices would be, but not why they fail to agree to link to one of the obvious candidates-e.g., the CPI. Failing to link to any such index is equivalent, it should be noted, to linking to the particular (degenerate) index whose value is constant over time. But why choose that index in preference to the CPI? It seems highly implausible that the constant index could do a better job than the (P1 of eliminating risks for that vast majority of contracts that implicitly use it. The constant index is in principle preferable to the CPI only for those agents whose most-preferred index is negatively correlated 30 with the CPI. 31 An approach that seems more promising begins with the observation that in most actual economies the medium of exchange is also used as the medium of account. Although the latter function could in principle be served by some commodity or commodity bundle other than money (the medium of 32 exchange), it usually is not. In a typical monetary economy, then, a seller who quotes prices in units other than the monetary unit of account forces potential buyers either to convert those prices into money prices or to agree to a bargain expressed in unfamiliar terms. Either way, this seller imposes some extra informational costs onto the buyer. Now these costs are quite small in magnitude, obviously, and would be willingly accepted by the buyer if they came along with other advantages. But the only advantage that is necessarily associated with these computational costs is the reduction in risk that is provided by the indexation. And in many cases, the value to the buyer of the maximum possible reduction in risk will be exceedingly smalleven smaller than the value of the extra computational cost.
To develop credibility for this last assertion, I will proceed by posing the following question for the reader: do you personally have an indexed salary agreement with your employer? If not, why not? In my own case, the first answer is "no" and the second answer is "because it seems pretty unimportant." More specifically, my Dean and I both understand about the effects of inflation on nominal salary agreements and we both know about the guesses of -economic forecasters concerning the likely course of inflation over the next year. So each year's nominal salary that we agree upon will reflect the mean of the distribution of the random variable "next year's inflation," that is, the "expected inflation rate." It is only the uncertainty concerning this rate that provides any reason for indexation. But how much uncertainty is there regarding the average inflation rate over the next year?
To me it seems reasonably certain that the realized value will lie within 2 percentage points of the expected rate. How much, then, would I be willing to pay for insurance to remove that amount of price level uncertainty? The answer is certainly not zero, but it is also small enough that I do not bother to even raise the issue with my Dean-and my guess is 33 that the same is true for most readers.
But the crucial point is this: whatever the value of insurance against nominal risk in one's salary over a year, for the price of most products that one purchases-books, phonograph records, sacks of coffee beans, boxes of pasta-the value of insurance against nominal fluctuations must be vastly smaller, probably two or three orders of magnitude. Consequently, I would be willing to pay an insurance company exceedingly little-less, say, than 1/100 of one dollar-to insure me against the risk associated with unanticipated inflation effects on coffee bean prices over the next quarteryear. Indeed, the value to me of such insurance is less than the value of the computational costs that I would have to bear if my coffee bean supplier were to price his merchandise in indexed terms. I would rather, that is, that he simply post dollar prices for one-pound sacks of Columbian Suprerno.
My guess, then, is that the same is true for most buyers of most products. Sellers, accordingly, respond to their customers' preferences by 34 offering products priced in terms of unindexed dollars.
It is important to note that this argument does not predict that there will be no linkage or indexation. On the contrary, it suggests that the benefits of linkage would outweigh the costs in the case of large contracts of long duration-mortgages, for instance. One-year wage contracts are perhaps close to the magnitude/duration combination that would make indexation worthwhile. But for most final products sold to consumers, it seems clear that the potential benefits of indexation are even smaller than the computational cost due to the expression of prices in unfamiliar units.
It must be emphasized that the foregoing argument pertains only to the second aspect of the nominal price stickiness puzzle, as described on p. 19.
Thus it attempts not to rationalize the existence of price stickiness, but to explain why any such stickiness that prevails could plausibly be in terms of nominal prices. Our conclusion, however, is that there is a good reason to believe that final product prices can rationally be expressed in nominal terms. That implies that some analyses explaining the predetermination of prices-the first aspect of the puzzle-may be reasonably interpreted as pertaining to nominal prices, even if these analyses as developed are More specifically, we need to consider whether Lucas's estimates are dependent upon any special assumptions concerning the source of the business cycle or the type of economy in which the typical household resides. At first glance, it would appear that there are no such assumptions involved, for the only aspect of the economy that Lucas even discusses in deriving these estimates is the utility function of the representative household. In his words, the calculations are generated "without saying much more about the nature or workings of the economy than ... [that] an economic system is a collection of people and serious evaluation of economic policy involves tracing the consequences of policies back to the welfare of the individuals they affect" (1985, p. 21) . And indeed the procedure is almost model-free.
But there is one assumption built into the argument that warrants explicit mention. That is the assumption that cycles are generated by a process which keeps fluctuations around some reference path and the level of that path entirely separate. Stabilization policy, consequently, is by assumption unable to affect the average level of aggregate consumption. Now to me that is an attractive assumption-it is a variant of the natural-rate hypothesis mentioned above-but it must be recognized that it is not innocuous in the context of the present issue. If cyclical fluctuations were generated by an economy of the type depicted by Barro and Grossman (1.976) Throughout, this paper has taken positions that must be regarded as more on the "Keynesian" than the "classical" side of the issues at hand.
As this is something that makes me uneasy, I would like to point out in conclusion that the specific positions taken here do not constitute endorsement of typical macroeconomic analysis of the pre-rationalexpectations variety. The two main failings of the latter were (i) reliance on models that imply permanent output-inflation tradeoffs and (ii) emphasis on point-in-time policy analysis of a type that permits dynamic inconsistency. Acceptance of the arguments of the present paper does not entail approval of either of those practices. model, see Lucas (1985) . A recent paper by Prescott (1986) is also germane.
3. And not clearly described.
4. Kydland (1984) has explored elaborations that improve performance in some ways, but do not bear on the problem discussed in the next paragraph.
5. This they can do, of course, because of the unobservability of technology shocks.
Elementary calculations show that the Kydland-Prescott technology shock
has an unconditional standard deviation of 0.029 (quarterly data) -More recently, Prescott (1986) has reported on some efforts to obtain an independent measure of the magnitude of technology shocks. The procedure is essentially that of attributing production function residuals to "technical change," as in the growth accounting literature. In that literature, however, it is usually presumed that the use of unadjusted capital and labor inputs will result in a severe overestimate of the effects of technical change (see, e.g., Denriison 1962). 7. To be more precise, Sims es incktrial production or real GNP and 9. The figures are 37% in the monthly-data study in Sims (1980) and 36%
in the quarterly-data version in Sims (1982) . These values are based on 48-month and 14-quarter forecast horizons, respectively.
10. It should be kept in mind that, since all influences are attributed in this innovation-accounting framework to the innovation in some variable, Sims's argument also rules out substantial effects from non-surprise monetary fluctuations.
11. An explicit example, illustrating this point, is worked out in McCallum (1983). 12. In Sims (1980) , the interest rate innovations account for 30% of the explanatory power for industrial production-corresponding closely to the fall from 37% to 4% for the Ml innovations. In Sims (1982) , the interest rate figure is 19% while the Ml fall is from 36% to 14%.
13. For a detailed argument and additional references, see McCallum (1985) .
14.
It should be noted that 16. The impact of that evidence is also considerably weakened by the fact that it pertains to data that has not been detrended in any way. Eichenbaurn and Singleton (1986) show that the extent of Granger-causality from nominal to real variables in the postwar U.S. data is reduced by the removal of a linear trend from the logarithmic variables, and is virtusily eliminated when first differences are used instead of log levels. In this regard, however, the argument of Section 4 below is relevant. 17. It has subsequently been utilized and/or developed further by King and Plosser (1984) , Wasserfallen (1984) , Stulz and Wasserfallen (1985) , and
Nelson (1985) .
18.
Nelson and Plosser (1982, p. 159) recognize this theoretical possibility but assume that it is not of practical importance.
19. And also Stulz and Wasserfallen (1985) .
20. For simplicity, let us abstract from the possible presence of a seasonal component.
21. This class is contrasted with that of the "trend stationary" (or TS) type, whose members include deterministic trend components (functions of calendar time) and no autoregressive unit roots. It should be noted that these two classes are not exhative.
22. In particular, the first autocovariance equals Oicr, -(1-Or) u1 -cr. 26. It might be conjectured, moreover, that there is no purely statistical procedure that will reliably discriminate between DS and TS series. If that conjecture is correct, the task of understanding the extent of cyclical variability-and whether it stems from monetary policy or other sourceswill have to rely upon the interaction of statistical analysis with substantive economic theorizing, difficult and controversial though that path may be.
27. The four critical facts listed in McCallum (1982) are as follows:
(i) output and employment magnitudes exhibit significant persistence;
(ii) output and employment are strongly and positively related to contemporaneous money stock surprises; (iii) output and employment are not strongly and positively related to contemporaneous price level surprises; and (iv) real wage movements are not countercyclical.
28. As formulated by Lucas (19725) , the natural-rate hypothesis asserts that there is no path of nominal variables that will yield a permanent increase in output (or employment) relative to its natural-rate value.
Effects of the type emphasized by Tobin (1965) alter the natural-rate value, not the actual value relative to the latter.
29. Eden's (1984) own theory, incidentally, differs from the one sketched below in that it hinges upon strategic informational considerations. A key argument goes as follows: ilf ... all other sellers quote prices in fixed dollar terms, the individual seller may find it difficult to make his price contingent on the money supply. The reason is that information is not prohibitively expensive, and buyers may suepect that the seller who offers a contingent price has boht the information. They will, therefore, hesitate to enter into a bet with him... It (Eden, 1984, p. 259) . That Eden stresses linkages to the money stock rather than a price index is, incidentally, of little importance in the present context.
30
. Thoth expressed differently, this argument is, I believe, basically similar to Parkin's (1977) .
31. This approach, it should be noted, pertains only to the second aspect of the puzzle described above.
32. On this subject, see Niehans (1978) and White (1984) . 34. This argument does not prestnne that there is any explicit contractual agreement between seller and buyers; its purpose is to explain the absence of linkage arrangements that would provide, for example, daily adjustments in all nominal prices in a retail outlet such as a grocery store, leaving the relative prices as implied by the shelf prices on individual items. The argument is more appealing for consumer products than for inditrial goods.
35. A satisfactory analysis of the first aspect will have to take account of Barro's (1977) important objection to Fischer-style contract models--i.e., that they neglect the quantity-determination provision of the contracts. In this regard, emphasis on product markets, rather than labor markets, should be useful as the less formal nature of ongoing relationships tends to induce a tighter link between quantities exchanged and current prices.
36. It might reasonably be questioned whether the type of argument here developed, which relies on the smallness of costs to individuals of failing to index their contracts, can plausibly be responsible for cyclical fluctuations that apparently have major effects on those individuals. A way in which precisely this type of phenomenon can occur has recently been explained by Akerloff and Yellen (1985) .
37. The smallness of this number provides some indirect support, it should be noted, for the argument of Section 5 above. There is a close relationship between Lucas's conceptual experiment and the one implicit in my question about salary indexation.
38. Even if expectations are assumed to be formed rationally.
39. Whether or not one works with a model in which '1a11 markets clear" is a matter of convention, but whether this clearing pertains to auction-type markets, or to ones with nominal contracts (perhaps implicit) that have allocational effects, is not.
